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IT'S AN EX POST FACT: SUPREME COURT
IVHSAPPLIES THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSE
TO CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STATUTES
Carmell v. Texas, 120 S. Ct. 1620 (2000)
I. INTRODUCTION

In Carmll v. Texas,' the Supreme Court held that the Ex
Post Facto Law Clause of the United States Constitution2 prohibited the application of a Texas statute of criminal procedure3 in
trials against sexual offenders for their offenses committed prior
to the amendment of the statute in 1995. 4 The Court reasoned
that the amendment to the Texas statute altered the sufficiency
of the evidence needed to convict criminal defendants, and thus
it qualified as an ex Vost facto law as such under the seminal
case of Calder v. Bull. In particular, the court was persuaded
that the facts of Carmrell mirrored the 300 year-old case of Sir
John Fenwick, the same case that Justice Chase cited in Calde

'120 S. Ct. 1620 (2000).
§ 10, cl. 1. ("No state shall... pass any Bill of Attainder, ex

2 U.S. CONsT. art. I,

post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts....").
I The Statute authorized conviction of sexual offenses on a victim's testimony
alone, under certain conditions. See TEX. CODE CRMI. P. ANN. art. 38.07 (West 2000)
(providing that a conviction "is supportable on the uncorroborated testimony of the
victim of a sexual offense if the victim informed any person, other than the defendant, of the alleged offense within one year after the date on which the offense is alleged to have occurred," or if "the victim was younger than 18 years of age at the time
of the alleged offense.")
4 See Carnell, 120 S. Ct. at 1643 (holding that petitioner's convictions pursuant to
Article 38.07 could not be sustained under the Ex Post Facto Law Clause).
" See id. at 1625, 1631 (reasoning that "Article 38.07 is unquestionably a law 'that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law
required at the time of the commission of the offense, in order to convict the offender."); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798) (noting that "every law that alters the
legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender," is an ex post facto law).
6 3 U.S. at 389.
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for the proposition that statutes altering the sufficiency of the
evidence needed to convict were invalid ex post facto laws.7
This Note argues that the Supreme Court's decision was incorrect. First, the majority incorrectly found that Texas Article
38.07 altered the sufficiency of the evidence needed to obtain a
conviction.8 Instead, Texas Article 38.07 is functionally identical
to rules of witness competency, and is not ex post facto as such
under the principles of Calder.9 Second, the Court erroneously
analogized the facts of John Fenwick's case to Carmell's situation.'0 Finally, even if the majority were correct in its assertion
that Texas Article 38.07 qualifies as an ex post facto law as defined in Calder," the majority ignored subsequent case law that
effectively reinterpreted the Calder definition, to the exclusion
of Calder's fourth category of ex post facto laws, those which alter the legal rules of evidence.
II. BACKGROUND
A. HISTORYAND PURPOSE OF THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSE

Article I, Section 10, clause 1 of the United States Constitution provides that "no state shall.., pass any bill of attainder, ex
' See Carmell, 120 S. Ct. at 1629, 1631 (noting that "the circumstances of petitioner's case parallel those of Fenwick's case 300 years earlier").
at 1648 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority "places... its
See id.
greatest weight on the 'sufficiency of the evidence' label," a label that "will not stick").
' See id.at 1649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (reasoning that "the corroboration requirement of Article 38.07 is functionally identical to a conditional rule of witness
competency").
" See id. at 1654 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (reasoning that the facts of the petitioner's are distinguishable from the facts of Fenwick's case).
" 3 U.S. at 390 (writing for the majority, Justice Chase explained that there were
four categories of ex post facto laws:
1st. Every law that makes an action, done before the passing of the law, and which
was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2nd. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was when committed. 3rd. Every law that changes
the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime,
when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or
different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in
order to convict the offender.
The fourth category is at issue in Carmell).
12See id.; Carmell 120 S. Ct. at 1651 (Ginsburg, J, dissenting) (reasoning that the
Calderdefinition had been changed, and that "a strong case can be made that... (the
Court] pared the number of Calder categories down to three, eliminating altogether
the fourth category ").
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post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts."'3
The framers of the Constitution drafted this clause in order to
restrain State legislatures from acts of injustice against citizens,

in both criminal and civil matters.-4 In particular, the framers

were concerned with the power of the Parliament of Great Britain to pass bills of attainder and bills of "pains and penalties"
specifically against individuals or classes of individuals. Bills of
attainder imposed a sentence of death and bills of pains and

penalties imposed lesser punishment.'5 The framers were concerned that bills of attainder violated the principle of separation
of powers. When a legislature passed a bill of attainder, the legislature passed judgment on an individual. The framers consid-

ered this act to be "an exercise ofjudicial power." '
Literally, the prohibition against ex post facto laws encompasses any law with a retrospective application, that is, any law
applying "after the fact."' 7 At the very heart of this prohibition is
the notion that a citizen cannot be deprived of life, liberty,
property, or reputation for an act which, at the time it was
committed, did not violate any law.' 8 As the Court noted in

Ogden v. Saunders,'9 "laws of this character are oppressive, unjust,
and tyrannical; and, as such, are condemned by the universal

U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
It is important to note that the clause includes three categories of impermissible
laws: bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts. The first two deal with criminal matters; the third with civil matters. See
Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213, 216 (1827) (explaining that the framers prohibited
bills of attainder and ex post facto laws "in order to restrain the State legislatures
from oppressing individuals by arbitrary sentences, clothed with the forms of legislation, and from making retrospective laws applicable to criminal matters").
" See Calder,3 U.S. at 389.
16 d.
17 See id. at 390 (reasoning that the literal meaning of ex post facto
is "only, that a
law shall not be passed concerning, and after the fact, or thing done, or action committed"); Derek J.T. Adler, Ex Post Facto Limitations on Changes in Eiddentiazy Law: Repeal of Accomplice CorroborationRequirements, 55 FORDHAM L REv. 1191, 1192 (1987)
(explaining that the term "ex post facto law" would "literally refer to any law . . .
which gives legal consequences to actions or events that took place before the date of
its passage").
" Ogden, 25 U.S. at 266 (explaining that "the States are forbidden to pass any...
ex post facto law, by which a man shall be punished criminally or penally, by loss of
life, of his liberty, property, or reputation, for an act which, at the time of its commission, violated no existing law of the land").

19Id-
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The Court recognized in Calder

that entrusting State and Federal legislatures with such power
was contrary to the core concept of free Republican government, in which men enter into society willingly in order to form
a social compact.21 As Justice Chase explained, "this fundamental principle flows from the very nature of our free Republican
governments, that no man should be compelled to do what the
laws do not require; nor to refrain from acts which the laws
permit., 22 The framers of the Constitution infused a great deal
of power into the federal legislature, but also left a great deal of
power to the state legislatures to "enjoin, permit, forbid, and
punish; . . . declare new crimes; and establish rules of conduct
for all ... citizens in future cases; . . . [and] command what is

right, and prohibit what is wrong. 2 3 However, the framers did
not entrust the federal or the state legislatures with the power to
"change innocence into guilt; or punish innocence as a crime;
lawful private contract; or
or violate the right of an antecedent
24
the right of private property."
Commentators have noted that the Ex Post Facto Clause in
the Constitution serves three main functions.2 5 First, it provides
notice to the public "to assure that legislative acts give fair warning of their effect." 26 Second, it protects the right of citizens to
reasonably rely on existing laws in choosing what actions to take,
without fear that the laws will be changed capriciously or mali20

I ("[T]he injustice and tyranny which characterizes ex post facto laws, consists

altogether in their retrospective operation, which applies with equal force, although
not exclusively, to bills of attainder.").
" See Calder,3 U.S. at 388; Wayne A. Logan, The Ex Post Facto Clause and theJurisprudence of Punishmen 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1261, 1275 (1998) (noting that 'James Madison proclaimed that 'ex post facto laws ... are contrary to the first principles of the
social compact, and to every principle of sound legislation").
22 Calder,3 U.S. at 388.
23 Id.
24

' SeeAdler, supra note 17, at 1196-97; David S. Matteo, Welcome toAnytown, U.S.A.Home of Beautiful Scenery (and a Convicted Sex Offender): Sex Offender Registration and Notification Laws in E.B. v. Verniero, 43 VILL. L. REV. 581, 595 (1998); Logan, supra note
21, at 1276.
See Carmell v. Texas, 120 S. Ct. 1620, 1650 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(quoting Weaverv. Graham,450 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1981) ); Adler, supranote 17, at 1196.
(noting that it "ensures that citizens are given fair warning of what acts will be penalized and to what extent"); Matteo, supra note 25, at 595; Logan, supra note 21, at 1276
(noting that "ex post facto laws are especially unfair because they deprive citizens of
notice of the wrongfulness of behavior, and thus result in unjust deprivations").
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ciouslyY7 Third, it preserves the principle of separation of powers by ensuring that "legislatures do not meddle with the judiciary's task of adjudicating guilt and innocence in individual
cases."2s The ban on ex post facto laws not only prevents the
legislature from adjudicating guilt and innocence for an individual, but it also prevents the legislature from acting ins an arbitrary or vindictive fashion while acting in ajudicial vein.
B. THE EARLY CASES: CALDER V. BULL AND CUMMINGS V. MISSOURI

The early case of Calder v. Bull was the first to address the Ex
Post Facto Clause of the Constitution.s" In the oft-quoted opinion written by Justice Chase, the Court explored the parameters
of the Clause, and set out a four-category definition of ex post
facto laws.!' In the case of Cummings v. Missouri,-" the Court first

applied the fourth Calder category, regarding a law that "alters
the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of
the offence, in order to convict the offender."" Consideration
of these two early cases is crucial to understanding which procedural provisions the Court understood to be ex post facto in
nature.

Calder v. Bull involved a resolution passed by the legislature
of Connecticut that set aside a decree of the Court of Probate of
Harford.m The decree in question disapproved and refused to
record Normand Morrison's will.s As a result of this legislative
' See Adler, supra note 17, at 1197; Mary-Marsha Porter Loe, Arhansas Sexual Offender Registrationand Notification Laws: An Ex Post Facto Violation?,53 ARY. L REV. 175,
189 (2000) (explaining that "in order to achieve fundamental fairness, people must
know the law before they act"); Carmde4 120 S. CL at 1650 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1981) ) (noting that the Clause "permit[s] individuals to rely on... (a law's] meaning until explicitly changed").
See Carme!/ 120 S. Ct. at 1650; Adler, supra note 17, at 1193-94 (explaining that
the framers included the Ex Post Facto Clause to "uphold the separation of powers by
preventing improper legislative interference in the judicial process").
2 See Adler, supra note 17, at 1197 (explaining that the ban on ex post facto laws
"prevents arbitrary or vindictive acts on the part of the legislature"); Matteo, supra
note 25, at 595.
See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 387 (1798).
Seesuranote 11 (setting out the four-category definition).
3271 U.S. 277 (1866).
Calder,3 U.S. at 390.
Id. at 386.
3
Id.
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resolution, Mr. Morrison's will was probated and recorded.30
Calder and his wife, who would have inherited the estate if the
will had not been probated, as the Court of Probate had originally ordered, were disinherited. 7 Caleb Bull, whose wife was
named in Mr. Morrison's will, inherited the estate."' Calder and
his wife claimed on appeal that the legislative resolution to set
aside the decree of the probate court was an ex post facto law. 9
The Court held that the legislative decree was not an invalid
ex post facto law. 0 Justice Chase reasoned that the Ex Post
Facto Clause encompassed only penal statues, and that the
"framers of the Constitution... understood and used the words
in their known and appropriate signification, as referring to
crimes, pains, and penalties, and no further.""' Because Calder's case involved a civil matter, the legislative resolution could
not be ex post facto under the Constitution as a matter of definition.
Justice Chase further explored the Ex Post Facto
Clause in reaching his holding, and explained there were four
types of ex post facto laws:
1st. Every law that makes an action, done before the passing of the law,
and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action.
2nd. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was,
when committed. 3rd. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when
committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and
receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the
43 time of
the commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender.

In developing this definition, Justice Chase explained that
he relied heavily on the works of William Blackstone and RichSee id.
See idat 387.
SId.
39Id17

" See id. at 397 (noting that ex post facto laws are limited to penal statutes: "they
extend to penal statutes and no further; they are restricted in legal estimation to the
creation, and, perhaps, enhancement of crimes, pains and penalties").
" Id. See Adler, supra note 17, at 1193 (explaining that the Ex Post Facto Clause
has been interpreted to prohibit only legislative acts that operate to the detriment of
a criminal defendant).
42 3 U.S. at 397 (noting that "ex post facto laws must be limited
in the manner already expressed [to criminal statues]; they must be taken in their technical, which is
also their common and general, acceptation, and are not to be understood in their
literal sense").
4- Id. at 390.
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ard Wooddeson, as well as the definitions given in the constitutions of Maryland, North Carolina, and Massachusetts.4
As an example of the fourth category of ex post facto laws,
Justice Chase cited briefly to the case of Sir John Fenwick in
1 6 9 6 .4 The details of this case are important because the Carmelt Court relied significantly on them in determining that laws
that altered the sufficiency of evidence needed to obtain a
criminal conviction were ex post facto."
In SirJohn Fenwick's case, an act of Parliament proclaimed
that two witnesses were necessary to convict a person of high
John Fenwick, a Jacobite, plotted with two cotreason 4
conspirators to restore James II to the throne after his overthrow by King William EEI in the Revolution of 1688." The
number of conspirators expanded over the course of a few
months, and the throne began arresting the conspirators one by
one after three of them disclosed the restoration plot to the
King.4 9 The conspirators were systematically arrested, tried,
convicted of treason and put to death.50
When Fenwick was eventually arrested, there were only two
witnesses among the group of conspirators who could prove
Fenwick's guilt, George Porter and Cardell Goodman.51 Fenwick's wife was successful in bribing Goodman to leave the
country, and under the act of Parliament, Porter's testimony
alone would not be sufficient to obtain a conviction. 2
The House of Commons reacted to Goodman's absence by
passing a bill of attainder against Fenwick, nullifying the tvo" See id.at 391. It is important to note that none of the Constitutions cited byjustice Chase included a provision for the fourth category of Calder. The Massachusetts
constitution provided that ex post facto laws were "laws made to punish actions done
before the existence of such laws, and which have not been declared crimes by preceding laws; the Maryland Constitution provided that ex post facto laws were "retrospective laws punishing facts committed before the existence of such laws, and by
them only declared criminal"; and the North Carolina Constitution provided the exact same definition as the Maryland Constitution. Id.at 391-92.
See id.
at 389 n.A.
" See infra, Section IVA,at 37 (discussing the majority's analogy betwveen the facts
of Carmell's case and the facts of Fenwick's case).
" See Carmell v. Texas, 120 S. Ct. 1620, 1629 (2000).
4"See id
49See id.
50See id.
51See id.
12 See id. at 1630.
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witness requirement in his case. 3 Sir John Fenwick was beheaded on January 28, 1697.5' Justice Chase cited to Fenwick's
case as an example of ex post facto laws falling under the fourth
category, laws which alter the rules of evidence necessary to obtain a conviction."
In their concurring opinions in Calder,Justices Paterson and
Iredell provided their own definitions of ex post facto laws."'
Neither Iredell nor Paterson discussed Justice Chase's fourth
category.57 Justice Paterson adopted the language of the state
Constitutions of Maryland, North Carolina, and Massachusetts,
as well as William Blackstone's description of ex post facto
laws. 8 Justice Iredell provided the following definition: "[legislatures] shall not pass any ex post facto law; or, in other words,
they shall not inflict a punishment for any act, which was innocent at the time it was committed; nor increase the degree of
punishment previously denounced for any specific offence." In
adopting the language of the state constitutions, neither Justice
Iredell nor Justice Paterson made any mention of laws altering
the sufficiency of the evidence needed to obtain a criminal conviction when formulating a definition of ex post facto laws. 9
The Court did not consider the fourth Calder category again
until sixty-eight years later, in Cummings v. Missouri. In Cummings, the Court applied the fourth Calder category to invalidate
a "test oath" imposed by the Missouri state constitution. 6' In the
wake of the Civil War, Missouri's legislature implemented the
oath, designed to ensure loyalty to the Union.62 The affiant of
the oath was required to deny "that he ha[d] ever 'been in
armed hostility to the United States, or to the lawful authorities
53See id.
54 md

" See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 nA (1798).
6 See id. at 395-400.
57See id.;
Carme, 120 S. Ct. at 1651 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (highlighting the fact
that "Justices Paterson and Iredell in their own seriatim opinions gave no hint that
they considered rules of evidence to fall within the scope of the Clause").
"3 U.S. at 396 ("[Wjhen after an action, indifferent in itself, is committed, the
Legislator, then, for the first time, declares it to have been a crime, and inflicts a punishment upon a person who has committed it.").
'9 See Carme/!, 120 S. Ct. at 1651 (GinsburgJ., dissenting).
71 U.S. 277, 316 (1866).
61 m

62
See id.
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thereof,'" or "that he ha[d] ever, 'by act or word,' manifested
his adherence to the cause of the enemies of the United States,
foreign or domestic.. .."6 The Missouri constitution provided
that any person who was unable to take the oath was declared
incapable of holding certain offices in the state, including "'any
office of honor, trust, or profit."6 These offices included the
posts of "councilman, director, or trustee, or other manager of
any corporation, public or private, . . . professor or teacher in
any educational institution, or in any common or other
school."6 Additionally, the constitution provided that anyone
who did not take the oath could not practice law, or practice as
a "bishop, priest, deacon, minister, elder, or other clergyman, of
any religious persuasion, sect, or denomination."' Cummings,
a Roman Catholic Priest, was convicted of teaching and preaching without first having taken the oath.0 Cummings challenged
the oath on the grounds that it was an invalid ex post facto lawr s
The Court held that the test oath violated the Ex Post Facto
Clause of the Constitution.6 Justice Field, writing for the Court,
adopted the Calder four-category formulation and reasoned that
the test oath fell under the fourth category, the prohibition on
laws that change the "rules of evidence by which less or different
testimony is sufficient to convict than was then required."" Justice Field reasoned that the clauses in the test oath "subvert the
presumptions of innocence, and alter the rules of evidence,
which heretofore, under the universally recognized principles of
the common law, have been supposed to be fundamental and
unchangeable."7 Justice Field explained that the test oath
merely assumed that parties were guilty, without affording them
the presumption of innocence that is embedded in our legal
system.7 In promulgating such a test oath, Justice Field argued,

"Id.
64

id.

"Id. at 317.
6I&
67Id at 316.

6'See id. at 307.
6Id. at 332.
70
Id. at 326.
7'Id.at 328.
72 See id. (noting that the clauses in the test oath "assume that the parties are guilty;
they call upon the parties to establish their innocence; and they declare that such in-
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the state legislature had subverted one of the great principles of
"social security, to wit: that every man shall be presumed innocent until he is proven guilty."7 3 Justice Field reasoned that in

subverting one of the fundamental protections of the criminal
justice system, the presumption of innocence, the test oath altered the rules of evidence with regard to the sufficiency of the
evidence needed to convict, and that the test oath was ex post
facto under the fourth Caldercategory.74
C. THE COURT APPLIES THE FOURTH CATEGORY: KRING V.
MISSOURI, HOPT V. UTAH, AND THOMPSON V. MISSOURI

The Court next considered the fourth category of Calder in
1883's Kring v. Missouri.7 5 Shortly after Kring, in 1884, the Court
took up the subject again in Hopt v. Territory of Utah.7 In 1898,
the Court also addressed the fourth category of Calderin Thompson v. Missouri.7 7

These cases are important because they

changed the way in which the Court regarded the fourth Calder
category, and tested the parameters of which laws fell under the
fourth category.
In Kring, the Court invalidated a Missouri law of criminal
procedure as an invalid ex post facto law under the fourth category of Calder.78 Kring was charged with first-degree murder,
but, after negotiations with the prosecutor, ultimately pled
guilty to second-degree murder.9 When he was sentenced to
twenty-five years in prison, Kring appealed the conviction, claiming that the prosecutor promised only a ten-year sentence.0
The Supreme Court remanded his case for further proceedings,
and Kring was then tried and convicted for first-degree murder
and sentenced to death.8 '

nocence can be shown only in one way-by an inquisition, in the form of an expurgatory oath, into the consciences of the parties").
7- Id. at 330.
74See id
7' 107 U.S. 221 (1882).
71110 U.S. 574 (1884).
' 171 U.S. 380 (1898).
78 Kring, 107 U.S. at 235 (explaining that the Missouri law was "clearly ex post
facto").
71See id. at
80

See id.
81See id.

222.
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The law in Missouri at the time that Kring committed the
offense provided that a criminal defendant could not be tried
for first-degree murder after an accepted plea of guilty for second-degree murder was entered.2 In 1875, after Kring committed the offense, that law was abrogated, and criminal defendants
who pled guilty to second-degree murder could be tried for
first-degree murder."'
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the application of the
new law to Kring was a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause."
This holding adopted the fourth category of Calder,and gave it a
very liberal reading, noting that "any law passed after the commission of an offense which,. . .in relation to that offense, or its
consequences, alters the situation of a party to his disadvantage,
is an ex post facto law." 8
In Hopt v. Territory of Utah, the Court limited Kring's somewhat expansive reading of the fourth category of Calder, and
upheld the application of an amended statute allowing felons to
testify in criminal cases.m The defendant in Hopt wvas convicted
of first-degree murder, and his conviction was reversed by the
Court of Appeals on a writ of error. s7 In his second trial, Hopt
was again convicted of first-degree murder, and sentenced to
death. The prosecution at this second trial offered the testimony of a man who was serving a sentence for murder at the
m As of the date that Hopt committed the
time that he testified.8
offense, Utah law provided that convicted felons were incompetent to testify in criminal trials.9" After the date of the homicide,
but before the date of Hopt's first trial, the law was amended to
allow felons to testify." Hopt challenged his conviction on the

"2Seeid.at 224.
See id.at 223 (noting that the "law wvas abrogated, and for this reason the defendant could be tried for murder in the first degree, notwithstanding his comiction and
sentence for murder in the second degree").
'4 See id
lId at 235.

8'110 U.S. 574, 589 (1882)
"Id at 575.
&Id.
See idat 587.
"See id.
See id. at 588.
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basis that application of the new Utah law to his case violated
the Ex Post Facto Clause.
The Court held that application of the new Utah law, allowing felons to testify in criminal trials, did not violate the Ex Post
Facto Clause. 93 The Court reasoned that laws affecting witness
competency were not ex post facto under the fourth category of
Calder.9 Writing for the Court, Justice Harlan explained:
Statutes which simply enlarge the class of persons who may be competent to testify in criminal cases are not ex post facto in their application to prosecutions for crimes committed prior to their passage; for
they do not attach criminality to any act previously done, and which was
innocent when done, nor aggravate any crime theretofore committed,
nor provide a greater punishment therefore than was prescribed at the
time of its commission, nor do they alter the degree, or lessen the
amount or measure, of the proof which
was made necessary to convic95
tion when the crime was committed.

Justice Harlan further explained that laws of witness competency did not fall under the fourth category of Calder because
they did not change "the quantity or degree of proof necessary
to establish . . .guilt," and because they did not change the in-

gredients 96of the offense or the ultimate facts necessary to establish guilt.

In Thompson v. Missouri, the Court again altered the test for
determining whether a law fell under the fourth Calder category,
holding that a procedural law was ex post facto if it affected a
"substantial right" of the criminal defendant.9Y In Thompson, the
defendant was convicted of first-degree murder for the killing of
a priest with strychnine poison. 98 Thompson's trial centered on
a prescription for strychnine that the prosecution offered as
evidence against Thompson.9 The trial court admitted letters
written in Thompson's hand, allowing the jury to compare the
At the time that
letters to the strychnine prescription.'
Thompson committed the offense, such letters were inadmissi" See i&
'3Id. at 590.
"4Seeic at 589.
"Id- at 589-90.

171 U.S. 380, 384 (1898).
"See id.at 380-81.
"See id. at 381.
17

100See id.
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In 1895, the general assembly of Misble as a matter of law.'
souri passed a law providing that "comparison of a disputed
writing with any writing proved... to be genuine shall be permitted to be made by witnesses, and such writings and the evidence of witnesses respecting the same may be submitted to the
court and jury as evidence of the genuineness.., of the writing
in dispute.' ' 02 Thompson challenged the application of this new
law to his case, arguing that the letters should not have been
admitted'
The Court held that the application of the new Missouri law
did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.' The Court analyzed
Kring and Hopt, and adopted the language that procedural laws
were ex post facto where they "alter the situation of a party to
his disadvantage."0 5 The Court added, however, that the alteration must affect a "substantial right" of the criminal defendant.' 6 The Court concluded that "mere modes of procedure,"
were not ex post facto. Finally, Justice Harlan, writing for the
Court, explained that the law in this case was not ex post facto
because it did not "disturb the fundamental rule that the state,
as a condition of its right to take the life of an accused, must
overcome the presumption of his innocence, and establish his
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."'' 3 Justice Harlan explained
that the ultimate question of whether Thompson had written
the prescription was left for the jury to decide, and that the
jury's decision was governed by the same duty before and after
the passage of the law. °9
See id
101
102id.
103

1

See id at 382.

Id. at 388.
' Id at 383.
'0 See id at 384 (noting that the law in Kringwas invalidated because the right to
protection against a first-degree murder conviction was a "substantial one").
"7 Id at 386. Justice Harlan noted:
[I]t is well settled that the accused is not entitled of right to be tried in the exact mode, m
all respects, that may be prescribed for the trial of criminal cases at the Lime of the commission of the offense charged against him ... so fbr as mere modes of procedure are concerned, a party has no more right in a criminal than in a civil action to insist that his case
shall be disposed of under the law in force when the act to be investigated is charged to
have taken place.
0
s Id at 387.
109 Id. (reasoning that the ultimate determination "was left for the jury and the
duty of the jury, in that particular, was the same after as before the passage of the
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D. MODERN INTERPRETATION OF THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSE:

BEAZELL V. OHIO AND COLLINS V. YOUNGBLOOD

In the twentieth century, the Court addressed the question
of whether procedural statutes violated the Ex Post Facto Clause
in two important cases, Beazell v. Ohio"0 and Collins v. Youngblood."' The Court in Beazell appeared to abandon the Kring and
Thompson tests for determining if procedural rules violated the
Ex Post Facto Clause," 2 and in Collins the Court adopted Beazell's
reasoning, overruling Kring and Thompson outright."3 Beazell
and Collins changed the way the Court analyzed procedural
rules under the Ex Post Facto Clause.
In Beazell, the Court upheld a statute of criminal procedure
dealing with defendants who were jointly indicted, tried, and
convicted."' The defendants in Beazell were jointly indicted for
embezzlement." 5 At the time the defendants committed the offense, Ohio law provided that "when two or more persons are
jointly indicted for a felony, on application to the court for that
purpose, each shall be tried separately."" 6 After the commission
of the defendants' offense, but before their trials, the law was
changed to provide, "when two or more persons are jointly indicted for a felony, except a capital offense, they shall be tried
jointly, unless the court for good cause shown... order that one
or more of said defendants shall be tried separately.""17 Beazell
was jointly tried with his co-defendant, and convicted."" He
challenged application of the new law to his case on the basis
that it violated the Ex Post Facto Clause." 9

statute. The statue did nothing more than remove an obstacle arising out of a rule of
evidence....").
", 269 U.S. 167 (1925).
..
,497 U.S. 37 (1990).
112See Beazell 269 U.S. at 170-171.
,' See Collins, 497 U.S. at 43 (explaining that "the Beazell formulation is faithful to
our best understanding of the Ex Post Facto Clause: Legislatures may not retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts.");
Id. at 50-51 (overruling Kring overruling Thompson).
" See Beazell 269 U.S. at 171.
...
Id. at 168.
116 Id
"'m
Iat
169.
118
Id
19 See i.
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The Court held that application of the new Ohio statute to
Beazell's case did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. ' " Justice
Stone, writing for the Court, set out the definition of ex post
facto laws as follows:
It is settled, by decisions of this court so well known that their citation
may be dispensed with, that any statute which punishes as a crime an act
previously committed, which was innocent when done, which makes
more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission, or
which deprives one charged with crime of any defense available according to law at the time when the act was committed, is prohibited as ex
121
post facto.

In setting out this definition, Justice Stone omitted the
fourth category of Calder22 However, the Court did reason that
the Ohio statute was not ex post facto, in part because "the
quantum and kind of proof required to establish guilt, and all
questions which may be considered by the court and jury in determining guilt or innocence, remain the same."'* Justice Stone
acknowledged that previous judicial decisions have held that alterations of the rules of evidence or procedure could be ex post
facto, and cited Calder, Cummings, and Kring.24 But Justice
Stone explained that these kinds of procedural changes were
not to be considered ex post facto unless they deprived the accused of a defense. If they operated "only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage," they were not ex post
facto125 Finally, Justice Stone explained that there was no formula for determining what alterations of procedure were "of
sufficient moment to transgress the constitutional prohibition."1 26 It could be argued thatJustice Stone collapsed the fourcategory Calder definition into three with this reasoning, includ-

"2
121

See id. at 171.
Id. at 169-70.

'2See

id. (making no reference to any law that "alters the legal rules of evidence..

SId at 170.

'24Id (explaining that "[e]xpressions are to be found in earlier judicial opinions to
the effect that the constimtional limitation may be transgressed by alterations in the
rules of evidence or procedure").
.id at 170-71.
26Id. at 171.

444

SUPREME COURT REVIEW

[Vol. 91

ing changes in the rules of evidence in the definition only if
they deprived the accused of a defense. 27
In Collins, the Court adopted the Beazell definition of ex post
facto laws, and upheld a Texas statute that allowed reformation
of improper verdicts.2 8 Defendant Carroll Youngblood was
charged and convicted of aggravated sexual assault, and was
sentenced by a jury to life imprisonment and a $10,000 fine.2'
The imposition of a fine was not authorized by statute, and, under the controlling case law, 30 the judgment and sentence were
void, and Youngblood was entitled to a new trial.13 '

While

Youngblood was in the process of petitioning for habeas corpus
relief, the legislature passed a law allowing appellate courts to
132
Relying on this law, the trial court
reform improper verdicts.
reformed Youngblood's verdict by ordering deletion of the
fine. 3 3 Under the old version of the law, Youngblood would
have received a new trial after the improper verdict was rendered."" Under the new law, the trial court was able to delete
the fine, thereby reforming the verdict without need for a new
trial. 35 Youngblood challenged the application of the new
his case on the basis that it violated the Ex Post
Texas statute to
36
Facto Clause.

The Court held that the application of the Texas statute did
not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. 37 ChiefJustice Rehnquist,
7 See Carmell v. Texas, 120 S. Ct. 1620, 1651 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Caldercategories had been pared down to three).
12 See Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 52. (1990)
'2'

See id at 39.

Bogany v. State, 661 S.W.2d 957 (1983).
See Collins, 497 U.S. at 39.
,-2 See id at 39-40 (citing TEx. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 37.10(b) (West 1990)).
'" See id at 40.
'

131 See

id at 39.

See id at 40.
...
136See id

Id at 52 (noting that application of the law to "respondent therefore is not prohibited by the Ex Post Facto Clause"). It is interesting to note that Justice Stevens,
author of the Carmell majority opinion, concurred in the judgment in Collins. See id.
at 52 (StevensJ, concurring in the judgment). Justice Stevens agreed with the conclusion in Collins, but reasoned that the conclusion was "entirely consistent with out
precedents." Id. at 52-53 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); see infra note 143
(discussing the Court's decision in Collins to overrule Kring and Thompson). Justice
Stevens reasoned that under the framework of Kring and Thompson, as interpreted by
Beazell, the question of whether a procedural statute has a sufficiently drastic impact
on a defendant to be characterized as "substantial" is "a matter of degree." See Collins
1,7
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writing for the Court, cited the four Caldercategories, and noted
that the principles of the definition, and the meaning of the
Clause itself, was best summarized by BeazelL
[A]ny statute which punishes as a crime an act previously committed,
which was innocent when done; which makes more burdensome the
punishment for a crime, after its commission, or which deprives one
at the
charged with crime of any defense available according to the law
ex post facto. 'S
time when the act was committed, is prohibited as

Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the Beazell formulation
omitted the fourth category of Calder and explained that the
Beazell formulation was faithful to "our best knowledge of the
original understanding of the Ex Post Facto Clause." s9 Chief
Justice Rehnquist pointed out that the early state constitutions
mirrored the formulation of ex post facto laws set forth in
Beazell." The Beazell formulation, according to Chief Justice
Rehnquist, comported with Blackstone's definition of ex post
facto laws as well.' 4' Chief Justice Rehnquist ultimately applied
the elements of the Beazell formulation, one by one, to Youngof2 the new
blood's case, and determined that the application
Facto Clause. 4
Post
Ex
the
offend
not
did
statute
Texas
In addition to adopting and applying the Beazell formulation
for determining whether a law is ex post facto, the Collins Court

v.Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 57 (1990) (StevensJ., concurring in the judgment). Justice Stevens proposed a "threshold test," under which the Court would nullify a procedural statute if it affected "the modes of procedure by which a valid conviction or
sentence may be imposed." Id. at 58 (Stevens,J., concurring in the judgment); see also
infra Section IVA,at 38 (Justice Stevens' discussion of procedural laws that disproportionately aid the prosecution in obtaining a conviction).
"sCollins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 42 (1990) (quoting Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S.
167 (1925)).
' Col!ins, 497 U.S. at 43.
1
See id.
(citing and discussing the state constitutions of Maryland and North Carolina).
141 Id. at 44 (Blackstone explained that ex post facto laws were passed "when after
an action (indifferent in itself) is committed, the legislator then for the first time declares it to have been a crime, and inflicts a punishment upon the person who has
committed it").
at 52 ("The Texas statute allowing reformation of improper verdicts does
" See id.
not punish as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done;
nor make more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission; nor
deprive one charged with crime of any defense available according to law at the time
when the act was committed. Its application to respondent therefore is not prohibited by the Ex Post Facto Clause of Art. I, § 10").

SUPREME COURTREVIEW

[Vol. 91

overruled two earlier cases, Kringand Thompson.13 In overruling
these cases, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that Kring and
Thompson's discussion of "substantial protections," and "substantial personal rights," had "imported confusion into the interpretation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.' 4' The Court reasoned that
testing a statute to determine if it was "merely procedural" or if
it implicated a "substantial right" was not consistent with the
original understanding of the Ex145Post Facto Clause at the time
that the Constitution was drafted.
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1996, defendant Scott Leslie Carmell was charged in a 15count indictment by a Texas grand jury for various sexual ofCarmell was
fenses committed against his stepdaughter. "'
charged with eight counts of indecency with a child, two counts
of aggravated sexual assault, and five counts of sexual assault
against his daughter; he was convicted on all fifteen counts in
the 367th District Court in Texas.4 7 Carmell committed the offenses against his daughter over a prolonged period of more
than four years, from February 1991 to March 1995. " " Carmell's
daughter was twelve years old when Carmell began victimizing
her, and sixteen when the conduct ceased. " 9 The assaults
ended in 1995, when Carmell's daughter told her mother what
had happened.' The Court sentenced Carmell to life imprisonment for each of the two aggravated sexual assault offenses
and imposed concurrent twenty-year sentences for each of the
remaining thirteen counts in the indictment. '-' Carmell was
,,3 I. at 50, 51 (overruling Kring, overruling Thompson). It is interesting to note
thatJustice Stevens, the author of the majority opinion in Carmell, did not agree that
Kring and Thompson should be overruled. See Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 5253 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); see also supra note 137. Instead,
Justice Stevens argued that the Court's conclusion was "entirely consistent with our
precedents." Collins, 497 U.S. at 52-53.
Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 45 (1990).
...
"' See id at 47 ("Neither of these decisions, in our view, is consistent with the understanding of the term 'ex post facto law' at the time the Constitution was
adopted").
16 See Carmell v. Texas, 120 S. Ct. 1620, 1624 (2000).
147See id.

8 see id.
Id.

149

150See id.

1 See id.
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convicted on all fifteen counts in the indictment
on the basis of
52
his daughter's uncorroborated testimony.
In 1992, when Carmell began victimizing his daughter, the
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provided:
A conviction under Chapter 21, Section 22.011, or Section 22.021,
Penal Code, is supportable on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim of the sexual offense if the victim informed any person, other than
the defendant, of the alleged offense within six months after the date on
which the offense alleged to have occurred. The requirement that the
victim inform another person of an alleged offense does not apply if the
victim was younger than 14 years of age at the time of the alleged offense.'1

Under the Texas statute, a sexual offender could not be
convicted on the basis of a victim's testimony alone, unless one
of two exceptions applied." The first exception created an
"outcry" provision; a victim's uncorroborated testimony was sufficient to support a conviction if the victim told anyone, other
than the defendant, about the offense within six months after
the date on which the offense was committed.'5 The second
exception created a "child victim" provision, which applied
based on the victim's age; a victim's uncorroborated testimony
was sufficient to support a conviction if the victim was under
fourteen years old on the date of the offense.'G Carmell committed eleven offenses against his daughter during the time that
these provisions were in effect. 57 Six of the offenses were committed when Carmell's daughter was under fourteen, and they
were not contested. 1m
On September 1, 1993, the Texas statute was amended.
The amendment extended the child victim exception to victims
under eighteen years of age. 9 Carmell was convicted in 1996
under the provisions of the amended statute.)O Of the fifteen
counts for which Carmell was charged, he committed four of
...
See Carmell v. Texas, 120 S. C. 1620, 1624 (2000).

"3See id at 1624 (quoting TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 38.07 (West 1983)).
'
See CarmeI, 120 S. Ct. at 1625.
153

See id. at 1624-25.

" See id. at 1625.
'57 See id. at 1626.

See Carmell v. Texas, 120 S. C. 1620, 1626 (2000).
See supra note 3 (the amendment also extended the time period on the outcry
provision to one year); Carmell, 120 S. Ct at 1625.
'0 See Carnel, 120 S. Ct. at 1624.
's'
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them while the older version of the statute was in place and
while his daughter was fourteen to fifteen years of age. 6' Thus,
if the older version of the statute were applied to these offenses,
Carmell's conviction could not stand; his daughter did not satisfy the outcry provision and was not young enough to qualify
under the child victim provision of the statute.
Five of the
remaining offenses for which Carmell was charged occurred after the amendment of the statute and were therefore not contested. 63 The two counts of aggravated sexual assault, for which
life imprisonment sentences were imposed, were not at issue. '
The defendant appealed four of his convictions for offenses
committed betweenJune 1992 andJuly 1993, during which time
his daughter was fourteen and fifteen years old and before the
Texas law was amended.'6 On appeal, Carmell argued that the
older version of the Texas statute should have applied to those
offenses committed prior to the 1993 amendment.'
Carmell
further asserted that the four convictions he was appealing
could not have stood under the older version of the statute because the victim's testimony was uncorroborated, the victim was
over fourteen years of age, and the victim had not made an outcry to satisfy the outcry provision. 67 Carmell argued that applying the new law to offenses committed before the statute was
amended violated the Constitutional prohibition on ex post
facto laws.r"
The Court of Appeals upheld Carmell's convictions, '9 holding that application of the amendment retrospectively to Carmell's offenses did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the
Constitution.7 0 The Court of Appeals reasoned that Texas Arti,61
See id at 1626.
162see id.
163See id.

'64
See Carmell v. Texas, 120 S. Ct. 1620, 1626 (2000).
165See i.
66

'

See i.

167See i&.

'8See id.
169See

Carmell v. Texas,963 S.W.2d 833 (1998).
id.at 836 (noting that "the statute as amended does not increase the
punishment nor change the elements of the offense that the State must prove. It merely
.removes existing restrictions upon the competency of certain classes of persons as
witnesses' and is, thus, a rule of procedure") (quoting Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 590
(1884) ).
171See
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cle 38.07 functioned as a rule of witness competency and was
therefore not an ex post facto law under the holding of Hopt v.
Utah.17' The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied discretionary review. 72 The United States Supreme Court granted
Carmell's pro se petition for certiorari and appointed counsel."n
IV.

SUMMARY OF OPINIONS

A. THE MAJORITY OPINION

On May 1, 2000, the Supreme Court reversed the decision
of the Court of Appeals of Texas, and vacated the convictions
against Carmell.' 7 Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens
ruled that the application of Texas Article 38.07, as amended, to
Carmell's four contested convictions, could not be sustained
under the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States ConstituIn particular, the Court reasoned that application of
tion.'
amended Texas Article 38.07 violated the Ex Post Facto Clause
under the fourth category of ex post facto laws as defined in the
early case of Calderv. Bull.'76
The Court first analyzed the components of the Texas
statute, and determined that "Texas courts treat Article 38.07 as
a sufficiency bf the evidence rule, rather than as a rule concerning the competency or admissibility of evidence."'" Justice Stev'"7 See Carme/,

963 S.W.2d. at 836; see also supra note 93.
See Carme!/ 120 S. Ct. at 1626.
'" See Carmell v. Texas, 120 U.S. 1620, 1626 (2000).
at 1643.
'74 See id&
"' See id. The Court split five to four in the decision, with justices Scalia, Souter,
Thomas, and Breyerjoining in the majority opinion. Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist joined, as well as justices O'Connor
and Kennedy. See id. at 1624. This split was described as extremely odd by commentators. See Tony Mauro, U.S. Supreme Court 1999-2000 Term in Rezdew; There Were Fewer
Cases but More Close Calls, TEXAS LAWYER, July 10, 2000, at 8 (noting that Carmell "produced the rarest alignment in the court: a majority composed of the left and right
wings with all the members of the court's center-Rehnquist. O'Connor and Kennedy-in dissent"). It is interesting to note that Justice Stevens concurred in the
judgment in Collins. See supra note 137, at 143 (discussingJusice Stevens' reasoning
that the question of whether procedural statutes violate the Ex Post Facto Clause is a
matter of degree); see also infra Section IVA, at 38-40 (discussion of procedural rules
altering the sufficiency of the evidence necessary to obtain a conviction).
176See Carmell, 120 S. Ct. at 1624.
'7 See id. at 1625 n.2 (explaining that the Texas statute included three components: an "outcry" provision, a "child victim" provision, and "a sufficiency of the cvi'72
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ens based this determination on the differences between the
consequences of the rules of evidence admissibility, and the
consequences of Texas Article 38.07.78 He noted that "when
evidence that should have been excluded is erroneously admitted against a defendant" under the ordinary rules of evidence,
an appellate court will reverse a conviction and remand for a
new trial, whereas a "failure to comply with Article 38.07, by
contrast, results not in remand for a new trial, but in the reversal of conviction and remand for entry of an order or acquittal."1
The Court then analyzed the history and purpose of the Ex
Post Facto Clause of the Constitution and adopted the definition of ex post facto laws set out in the early case of Calder v.
Bull.180 Justice Stevens explained thatJustice Chase derived the
four-category definition of ex post facto laws outlined in Calder
largely from the treatise of Richard Wooddeson, "one of the
great scholars of the common law."' 8 Justice Stevens noted that
the same formulation had been approved by such great academics as Joseph Story and James Kent. 82 In support of the formulaion, the majority cited a host of Supreme Court cases that had
adopted the four-category formulation 183 and argued that these
dence rule respecting the minimum quantum of the evidence necessary to sustain a
conviction").
'78Carmell v. Texas, 120 S. Ct. 1620, 1625, n.2 (2000).
7
9

Id.

"o See id. at 1626-31 (noting that "this Court.... has repeatedly endorsed [Cal-

der's] understanding, including, in particular, the fourth category"); for the fourcategory definition of ex post facto laws in Calderv. Bull, see supra note 11.
"8,
See Carmell, 120 S. Ct. at 1627-28 (noting that Wooddeson's treatise divided ex
post facto laws into three categories: "those respecting the crimes themselves; those
respecting the legal rules of evidence; and those affecting punishment (which ...further subdivided into laws creating a punishment and those making an existing punishment more severe)." The Court explained that Justice Chase's formulation
"correlate [s] precisely" to Calder's four categories).
182See id.at 1628.
"' Id. at 1628-29. The Court cited Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 441 (1997); Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293 (1977); Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U.S. 180, 18384 (1915); Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 593-94 (1901); Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 382 (1898); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 201 (1898)
(Harlan,J., dissenting); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 589-90 (1896); Duncan v.
Missouri, 152 U.S. 377, 382 (1894); Hopt v. Territory of Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 589
(1884); Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 228 (1883), rev'd on other grounds, Collins v.
Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990); Gut v. State, 9 Wall. 35, 38 (1870); Exparte Garland,
4 Wall. 333, 390-91 (1867) (Miller, J.,dissenting); Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277,
325-26 (1867).
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cases adopted the fourth category'8 of Calder in particular,
"sometimes quoting Justice Chase's words verbatim, sometimes
simply paraphrasing."''
In order to fully understand the implications of the fourth
category of Calder, the Court turned to the English case of Sir
John Fenwick' 86 The same case is cited in Calder under the
fourth category for the proposition that statutes altering the sufficiency of the evidence needed to convict a criminal defendant
are invalid, ex post facto laws.'n The majority analogized Fenwick's case to Carmell's, arguing that the laws in each case "alter[ed] the legal rules of evidence," receiving less testimony
than the law required at the time the offenses were committed."s Justice Stevens argued that the circumstances in Fenwick's case paralleled the circumstances in Carmell
Just as the relevant law in Fenvick's case required more than one
witness' testimony to support a conviction .... Texas' old version of Artide 38.07 required more than the victim's testimony alone to sustain a
conviction.... And just like Fenwick's bill of attainder, which permitted
the House of Commons to convict him with less evidence than was othenvise required, Texas' retrospective application of the amendment to
Article 38.07 permitted petitioner to beb convicted with less than the preg
viously required quantum of evidence.'

The Court then argued that the fourth category of Calder
functions as a safeguard against the subversion of "fundamental
justice.19O As Justice Stevens explained, the interests of fundamental justice were at the heart of the passage of the Ex Post
Facto Clause.' 9' The framers desired to protect against laws that
'" Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798) ("4th. Every law that alters the legal rules
of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the
time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender").
'Carmell v. Texas, 120 S. Ct. 1620, 1628-29 (2000).
I&For a discussion of the facts of SirJohn Fenwick's case, see supra Section I1B.
"8 See Carmell 120 S. Ct. at 1629-31; see also Calder 3 U.S. at 389 (citing "the case of
SirJohn Fenwick, in 1696" as an example of laws that "violated the rules of evidence.
.. by admitting one witness, when the existing law required two; by receiving evidence
without oath; or the oath of the wife against the husband; or other testimony, which
the courts ofjustice would not admit..
' Carmd4 120 S. Ct. at 1631.
"' Id. at 1631-32.
," Id. at 1632 (noting that "the fourth category, so understood, resonates harmoniously with one of the principal interests that the Ex Post Facto Clause ias designed
to serve, fundamental justice").
191 ad
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were "manifestly unjust and oppressive.' 92 The majority insisted
that the fourth category addressed these concerns directly and
that "a law reducing the quantum of evidence required to convict an offender is as grossly unfair as retrospectively eliminating
for an exan element of the offense, increasing the punishment
93
isting offense, or lowering the burden of proof."

The Court distinguished an ordinary amendment to the
rules of evidence from an alteration in the rules of evidence favoring the prosecution.'4 Justice Stevens pointed out that most
amendments to the rules of evidence apply in an evenhanded
fashion, adversely affecting or benefiting both sides equally.' 95 In
contrast, the Court argued that the amendment to Texas Article
38.07 could only benefit the prosecution.' 6 Justice Stevens argued that retroactively applying any statute such as this one,
"making it easier to meet the threshold for overcoming the presumption" of innocence, is fundamentally unfair. 197 He argued
that in so doing, the government "refuses, after the fact, to play
by its own rules, altering them in a way that is advantageous only
Thus, the
to the State, to facilitate an easier conviction."'
Court concluded that laws of this nature allow the government
to "subvert the presumption of innocence by reducing the
number of elements it must prove to overcome that presumption; by threatening such severe punishment so as to induce a
plea to a lesser offense or a lower sentence; or by making it easier to meet the threshold for overcoming the presumption."'"
The majority concluded that the four category definition of
ex post facto laws outlined in Calder,including the fourth category involving laws that alter the rules of evidence, continue to

" Carmell v. Texas, 120 S. Ct. 1620, 1632 (2000) (adding that the Ex Post Facto
Clause was drafted "as an additional bulwark in favour of the personal security of the
subject, to protect against the favorite and most formidable instruments of tyranny").
...
Id. at 1632-33.
'4See id. at 1633.
See id. (reasoning that rules of evidence "are ordinarily evenhanded, in the sense
that they may benefit either the State or the defendant in any given case," and arguing that regular rules regarding admissibility "do not at all subvert the presumption of
innocence, because they do not concern whether the admissible evidence is sufficient
to overcome the presumption").
19 See id.
"'Id.at 1633.
"98
Carmell v. Texas, 120 S. Ct. 1620, 1633 (2000).
199Id.
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be good law.200 The court also concluded that amended Texas

Article 38.07 fell under the fourth Calder category of ex post
facto laws.20 In light of this analysis, the Court held that retroactive application of amended Texas Article 38.07 to Carmell's
contested four convictions violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of
the United States Constitution.2
In response to the dissent's argument that Collins and Beazell
effectively re-formulated the definition of ex post facto laws 3
without using the fourth category of Calder,Justice Stevens argued that instead, Collins did not abandon the fourth category
and was "rather cryptic."2 The Carmell Court noted that Collins
referred to Calder'sfour categories as the "exclusive definition"
of ex post facto laws but also called Beazell's definition a "faithful" rendition of the original understanding of the clause, even
though it omitted category four.2
A footnote in Collins explains, as the majority pointed out, that "the Beazell definition
omits the reference by Justice Chase in Calder v. Bull to alterations in the legal rules of evidence. As cases subsequent to Calder make clear, this language was not intended to prohibit the
application of new evidentiary rules in trials for crimes committed before the changes."m Justice Stevens acknowledged that
Collins went on to assert that the Beazell formulation was true to
the original understanding of the Ex Post Facto Clause.2 But
Justice Stevens explained: "if Collins had intended to resurrect a
long forgotten original understanding of the Ex Post Facto
Clause, shom of the fourth category, we think it strange that it
would have done so in a footnote." 8 The majority concluded
that Collins merely "eliminated a doctrinal hitch" that had developed in the case law, defining the scope of the Ex Post Facto
Clause along the lines of distinguishing between substantial protections and procedural provisions.- Thus, the Court summarized, "Collins held that it was a mistake to stray beyond Calder's
' See id at 1643.
"'
2 See id

nSee id

See infraSection IVB.
2 Carml4 120 S. Ct. at 1635.

Carmell v. Texas, 120 S. Ct. 1620, 1635-36 (2000).
Id at 1635 (quoting Collins, 497 U.S. at 43, n. 3)
See Canne// 120 S. Ct. at 1635.
Id
at 1636.
2
Nid.
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four categories, not that the fourth category was itself mistaken.2 1 Justice Stevens ultimately determined that the Calder
categories had not been abandoned in Beazell or Collins.'
In response to the dissent's argument that the fourth category applies only to laws that alter the burden of proof,2 2 the

Court noted that there is no distinction between laws that alter
the burden of proof and laws that "reduce the quantum of the
evidence necessary to meet that burden. 21 3 The effect of both
kinds of laws, according to Justice Stevens, is the same: "the two
types of laws are indistinguishable in all meaningful ways relevant to concerns of the Ex Post Facto Clause. 'The legal result
must be the same, for what cannot be done directly cannot be
done indirectly. The Constitution deals with substance, not
shadows.'

21

4

In other words, the distinction between a law alter-

ing the burden of proof and a law lowering the quantum of the
evidence needed to meet that burden of proof is merely technical. 25 The effect of both, in regard to the legal result, however,
is the same. 1 6
Finally, the Court argued that the dissent's reliance on Hopt
for the proposition
.
217 that Article 38.07 functions as a rule of witness competency, rather than a sufficiency of the evidence
rule, is misplaced, and that 38.07 does not function as a rule of
211
witness competency. ' 8 In support of this contention, Justice
Stevens pointed out that both before and after the amendment
to Article 38.07, the victim's testimony was competent evidence
under the law. 9 Further, the majority explained that Hapt expressly distinguished between witness competency laws and laws
that "alter the degree, or lessen the amount or measure, of the
proof which was made necessary to conviction when the crime

210 Id.
211See id.
212See

infra Section IVB.
v. Texas, 120 S. Ct. 1620, 1637 (2000).
214Id (quoting Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277, 325 (1867)).
21 Carmel, 120 S. Ct. at 1637.
216see id.
217See supraSection IIB.
212Carmell

218Carmelg 120 S.Ct. at 1638-43.
219See

id. at 1639.
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argued, is the latmajority
38.07, the
was committed."m Article
rule.j
evidence
the
of
ter - a sufficiency
The Court distinguished between laws of witness competency and sufficiency of the evidence laws by explaining that
witness competency laws apply in an evenhanded fashion,
whereas the sufficiency of the evidence laws work in perpetual
favor of the prosecution. m In this case, Justice Stevens argued,
Article 38.07 functioned as a sufficiency of the evidence rule,
working only in favor of the prosecution in every case.M

B. JUSTICE GINSBURG'S DISSENT

In a dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justice O'Connor, and Justice Kennedy, Justice Ginsburg attacked the majority opinion on three general grounds. First,
Justice Ginsburg questioned the majority's conclusion that
Texas Article 38.07 is a "sufficiency of the evidence rule" and
argued that the statute is functionally equivalent to witness
competency and credibility rules, held to be non-violative of the
Ex Post Facto Clause under Hopt v. Utah.224 Next, Justice Ginsburg argued that the fourth category of Calder applied only to
those laws that lowered the prosecution's burden of persuasion.m Justice Ginsburg noted that Texas Article 38.07 in no
way affected "the burden of persuasion that the prosecution
must satisfy to support a conviction."2 Finally, Justice Ginsburg
argued that the fourth category of Calder is no longer valid
law.22 7 She argued that Collins v. Youngbloodm "pared the numMI&
221

See id

See id. at 1639-40 (noting that such rules will always run in the prosecution's favor, because "they always make it easier to convict the accused.... Witness competency rules, to the contrary, do not necessarily run in the State's favor. A felon
witness competency rule, for example, might help a defendant if a felon is able to relate credible exculpatory evidence").
' See id; See supra Section IVA, discussion of the majority's reliance on Fenwick's
case for the proposition that Texas Article 38.07 fell under the fourth Caldercategory
of ex post facto laws.
.. See Carmell v. Texas, 120 S. Ct. 1620, 1646 (2000). (Ginsburg, J. dissenting)
(noting that "the history of Article 38.07 bears out the view that its focus has always
been on the competency and credibility of the victim as a witness"); See Hopt v. Territory of Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (U.S. 1884).
' Id. at 1647 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting).
2Id.
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ber of Calder categories down to three, eliminating altogether
the fourth category on which the Court... so heavily relies."2' '
The dissent first attacked the majority by pointing out that
Texas Article 38.07 is not a "sufficiency of the evidence rule" as
the majority had claimed, but is rather a rule "functionally identical to a conditional rule of witness competency. 2 30 According
to Justice Ginsburg, Texas Article 38.07 is an evidentiary provision under which the jury may credit victim testimony.23 Thus,
if a victim falls under one of the exceptions in the statute (either by virtue of age alone, or by making an "outcry" within the
specified time period), the statute simply gives the victim full
testimonial stature, and an undiminished competency to testify. 23 2 The premise for this statute, the dissent argued, is the

legislative judgment that accusations made by sexual assault victims above a certain age were not independently trustworthy. 3
Justice Ginsburg likened the corroboration requirement in the
statute to corroboration requirements in similar evidentiary
provisions, particularly those regarding accomplices.2 The dissent argued that accomplice corroboration requirement statutes, like Texas Article 38.07, were "designed to ensure the
credibility of the relevant witness," not to affect
• • 23.5 the sufficiency
of the evidence required to obtain a conviction.
Justice Ginsburg further indicated that the legislative history
of Texas Article 38.07 bears out the interpretation of 38.07 as a
witness competency and credibility provision.23 6 As Justice Gins110 S.Ct. 2715 (1990).
Carmell 120 S. Ct. at 1651 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting).
2 Id- at 1649 (GinsburgJ., dissenting).
2" See id. at 1646 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (reasoning that "the version of Article
38.07 applied at Carmell's trial was thus, in both effect and purpose, an evidentiary
rule governing the weight that may be given to the testimony of sexual assault victims
who had attained the age of 14").
232 Id. at 1645 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that "If the victim is of a certain
age, the jury, in assessing whether the prosecution has met its burden of demonstrating guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, must give no weight to her testimony unless that
testimony is corroborated, either by other evidence going directly to guilt or by 'outcry"').
23 See id. (GinsburgJ., dissenting).
See id. at 1645-46 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that "it suffices to note that
Article 38.07's corroboration requirement rests on the same rationale that underpins
accomplice corroboration requirements: the notion that a particular witness, because
of his or her role in the events at issue, might not give trustworthy testimony").
"'I& at 1645 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting).
See i&. at 1646 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting).
"
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burg explained, "the historical development of Article 38.07 reveals a progressive alleviation of restrictions on the competency
of victim testimony, not a legislative emphasis on the quantum
of evidence needed to convict. " 2 7 The dissent explained that
Article 38.07 was functionally equivalent to a witness credibility
statute: "If the former version of Article 38.07 had provided
that 'the testimony of the victim shall be inadmissible to prove
the defendant's guilt unless corroborated,' it would produce the
same results as the actual statute in every case."2 s Under Hopt,29
Justice Ginsburg argued, rules of evidence affecting witness
competency do not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution.4
Next, Justice Ginsburg argued that Article 38.07 did not alter the prosecution's burden of persuasion and therefore did
not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause as interpreted through the
fourth category of Calder.24' The dissent pointed out that the
prosecution's burden of persuasion remains the same whether
or not Article 38.07 applies; regardless of its application, the
prosecution must prove all of the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.24 2 As Justice Ginsburg noted, if the
prosecution seeks to obtain conviction on the basis of a victim's
uncorroborated testimony, and the witness satisfies one of the
exceptions under Article 38.07, the conviction can only be obtained if the prosecution proves all the elements of the offense
beyond a reasonable doubt, regardless of the application of
38.07.243 Thus, satisfaction of 38.07 can be necessary to obtain a
conviction where the prosecution seeks to obtain the conviction
on the victim's uncorroborated testimony alone, but it is not sufficient unless the prosecution meets its burden of proving guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.24 Further, Justice Ginsburg argued,
the victim's testimony is not even necessary in many cases: "To
convict a defendant of sexual assault in Texas today as before
Id. (GinsburgJ., dissenting).
Id. at 1649 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting).
110 U.S. 574 (1884).
See id.
at 589 (emphasizing that "[s] tatutes which simply enlarge the class of persons who may be competent to testify in criminal cases are not ex post facto in their
27

application to prosecutions for crimes committed prior to their passage").
",See Carmell v. Texas, 120 S. Ct. 1620, 1647 (2000) (GinsburgJ., dissenting).
2'2
See id. (GinsburgJ., dissenting).
'See id. (GinsburgJ., dissenting).
21See id.(GinsburgJ., dissenting).
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1993, the prosecution need not introduce the victim's testimony
at all, much less any corroboration of that testimony." 45 The
dissent ultimately concluded that Article 38.07 merely functioned to restrict the State's method of proving its case, "without
affecting in any way the burden of persuasion that the prosecution must satisfy to support a conviction." 46
Additionally, Justice Ginsburg argued that the amendment
to Article 38.07 did not "reduce the quantum of evidence necessary" to convict, for the "simple reason that Texas has never required the prosecution to introduce any particular number of
witnesses or items of proof to support a sexual assault conviction" in the first place.24 Further, the dissent noted that Article
38.07 did not "subvert the presumptions of innocence," using
the language of the majority, because "the burden of persuasion
remained at all times with the State.248
In sum, Justice Ginsburg depicted the "sufficiency of the
evidence" needed to convict as an evidentiary hurdle; the 1993
repeal of the corroboration requirement for victims between
the ages of fourteen and eighteen did not lower that hurdle, according to Justice Ginsburg, but "simply expanded the range of
methods the State could use to surmount" that hurdle. 9
Finally, the dissent argued that the fourth category of Calder
has been effectively nullified by subsequent Supreme Court
cases.25 Justice Ginsburg highlighted the fact that the fourcategory definition of ex post facto laws in Calderwas dictum, as
Calderinvolved a civil statute, not a criminal one."' Further, the
dissent indicated that Justices Iredell and Paterson, in their own
concurring opinions, "gave no hint" that they considered the
211Id (GinsburgJ., dissenting).

(GinsburgJ., dissenting).
(Ginsburg,J., dissenting).
Id. at 1648 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority's reliance on

246Id

217 Id
248

Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277 (1867), from which the phrase "subvert the presumptions of innocence" originated, was misplaced, because Cummings dealt with a
post-Civil War amendment that assumed parties were guilty of treason unless they
swore an oath to establish their innocence. The dissent noted that "nothing of the
kind" is involved in the Carmellcase).
21 Carmelg 120 S. Ct. 1648 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting).
'See id. at 1651 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting).
2" See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explaining that 'Justice Chase's formulation
was dictum, of course, because Calderinvolved a civil statute and the court held that
the statute was not ex post facto for that reason alone").
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rules of evidence to fall within the scope of the Ex Post Facto
Clause. 2 Justice Ginsburg pointed to the ex post facto formuladon in Beazell and Collinsand noted that they omitted the fourth
category of Calder completely,1
In Beazell, Justice Ginsburg
noted, the Court catalogued ex post facto laws without even
mentioning Calder's fourth category,2 and Collins approved of
this formulation, concluding that "the Beazell formulation is
faithful to our best knowledge of the original understanding of
the Ex Post Facto Clause: Legislatures may not retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment for
criminal acts. "2s
The dissent attacked the majority's assertion that the Court
has repeatedly endorsed Justice Chase's formulation.2
Although the majority cited what Justice Ginsburg called "an impressive-looking" array of cases in support of this assertion, she
pointed out that all of the cases cited "simply quoted or paraphrased Chase's enumeration, a mechanical task that naturally
entailed a recitation of the fourth category. " 27 Further, the dissent noted that not one of these cases depended on the fourth
category for the judgment the Court reached. m Justice Ginsburg explained that the only two cases to strike down retroactive
application of rules as ex 9ost facto under the fourth category of
Calder, Kring v. Missouri" and Thompson v. Utah," ' were both
overruled by Collins.26'

22

Id.(Ginsburg,J., dissenting).

" See id. (GinsburgJ., dissenting) (noting that "fa]s long ago as 1925, in Beazell v.
Ohio,. . . the Court catalogued ex post facto laws without mentioning Chase's fourth
category at all").
2" See Beaze!4 46 S. Ct. at 68 (defining ex post facto laws as "any statute which punishes as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done, which
makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission, or which
deprives one charged with crime of any defense available according to law at the time
when the act was committed").
Carmell v, Texas, 120 S. Ct. 1620, 1651 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 43 (1990)).
2 Carmell 120 S. Ct. at 1651 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting).
Id.(GinsburgJ., dissenting).
2
"Id (Ginsburg,J., dissenting).
29 2 S. Ct. 443 (1883).
2' 18 S.Ct. 620 (1898).
" See Carmell v. Texas, 120 S. Ct. 1620, 1652 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(noting that "[ilt is true that the Court has on two occasions struck down as ex post
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V. ANALYSIS
The decision in Carmell was incorrect for three reasons.
First, the majority incorrectly asserted that Texas Article 38.07 is
a statute altering the sufficiency of the evidence needed to obtain a conviction."' Rather, Texas Article 38.07 functions as a
rule of witness competency and is not ex post facto as such under the principles of Calder.6 1 Second, the Court in Carmell relied too heavily on Sir John Fenwick's case, cited in Calder, in
reaching its holding. 26 Furthermore, the Court overstated the
analogy between the facts of this ancient case and Carmell's
situation. 26 Third, even if the majority were correct in its assertion that Texas Article 38.07 qualifies as an ex post facto law
under the fourth Calder category, the majority ignored subsequent case law that effectively nullified that category.2" The majority's reasoning further confuses the precedent to be applied
in determining whether procedural laws violate the Ex Post
Facto Clause by ignoring the formulation set forth in Beazell and
adopted in Collins, a formulation that had made important
strides toward eradicating such confusion.6 7
A. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE OR WITNESS COMPETENCY
PROVISION?

First, the majority's decision was incorrect because Justice
Stevens incorrectly asserted that Texas Article 38.07 is a rule altering the sufficiency of the evidence needed to obtain conviction. Instead, Texas Article 38.07 functions as a law of witness
competency and credibility.2 8 The majority's reasoning focused
facto the retroactive application of rules governing the functioning of the criminal
trial process-but both decisions have since been overruled").
"2 See id. at 1648 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court's "sufficiency of
the evidence label... will not stick").
2 See id. at 1649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (reasoning that "the corroboration requirement of Article 38.07 is functionally identical to a conditional rule of witness
competency").
26 See id at 1629 (turning to a lengthy discussion of Fenwick's case for "guidance").
See id at 1654 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (reasoning that the facts of the petitioner's case do not parallel the facts of Fenwick's case "300 years earlier").

' See id at 1651 (Ginsburg, J, dissenting) (reasoning that "a strong case can be
made that Collins pared the number of Caldercategories down to three, eliminating
altogether the fourth category on which the Court today so heavily relies").
267 See Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 45 (1990) (noting that prior precedent
had "imported confusion into the interpretation of the Ex Post Facto Clause").
'

See supranote 9.
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on the notion that "requiring only the victim's testimony to
convict, rather than the victim's testimony plus other corroborating evidence is surely 'less testimony required to convict. ' " 29
As such, the majority argued that Texas Article 38.07 is a sufficiency of the evidence rule that "governs the sufficiency of [the]
facts for meeting the burden of proof." 270
The majority's reasoning neglects one fundamental fact
about Article 38.07: it does not alter the reasonable doubt burden that the prosecution must carry in order to obtain a conviction.27 ' As the dissent pointed out, "[u]nder both the old and
the new versions of the statute, the applicable standard is proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.", 72 The majority insists that requiring only the victim's testimony, rather than the victim's testimony plus corroborating evidence, lowers the bar on what the
prosecution has to overcome to meet this burden, but this reasoning is flawed. 27 The prosecution is not required to produce
the victim's testimony in order to obtain a conviction; the
prosecution may put any evidence it chooses before the jury,
and as long as the prosecution meets its burden of proof, the
conviction will stand.274 Texas275Article 38.07 does not alter that
fundamental burden of proof.
Moreover, even if the prosecution were to produce only the
testimony of a victim who did meet the requirements under Article 38.07, that testimony would not be sufficient unless the

C
Garmell v. Texas, 120 S. CL 1620, 1631 (2000).
Id.at 1639.

id. at 1647 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
27Id.(Ginsburg,J., dissenting).
2 See Adler, supra note 17, at 1204-06 (explaining that accomplice corroboration
statutes, which are equivalent to Texas Article 38.07 in that they require corroborating evidence to "sustain a conviction," do not alter the ultimate burden of proof for
the trier of fact. Rather, they set out a threshold determination for the judge of
whether the testimony can be put before the trier of fact).
2' See Adler, supra note 17, at 1204-05. The author explains that accomplice corroboration laws require ajudge to make a preliminary determination of whether the
evidence may be put before the trier of fact. If the judge determines that there is sufficient corroborating evidence, the testimony may be put before the trier of fact. If
there is not sufficient corroborating evidence, the witness may not testify. Texas Article 38.07 functions as an accomplice corroboration law does: so long as the judge determines that there is corroborating evidence, the testimony is put before the trier of
fact, but the ultimate issue of whether the prosecution has met itsburden of proof
remains a question for the trier of fact.
27 See Carmel, 120 S. Ct. at 1647 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting).
2' See
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prosecution could convince a jury of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.276

Thus, 38.07 in no way affects the

of eviburden that the prosecution
2 77 must meet or the amount
dence required to meet it.

In fact, Article 38.07 functions exactly as a law of witness
competency does, making Carmell's case analogous to Hopt.218
As the dissent correctly explained, the policies behind 38.07 and
laws of witness competency are the same: in the passage of each
of these types of laws, the legislature expresses concern about
the credibility of a certain class of witnesses based on the special
circumstances involved in their case.' 79 The laws function in the
same manner as the dissent argues, because "if the victim is of a
certain age, the jury, in assessing whether the prosecution has
met its burden of demonstrating guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, must give no weight to her testimony unless that testimony is corroborated."8 Likewise, a law of witness competency
provides that the testimony of a certain class of witnesses is to be
given no weight by the jury. Because 38.07 operates as a rule of
witness competency, the dissent argued, it is analogous to Hopt,
and is not ex post facto because it "simply enlarge [s] the class of
persons who may be competent to testify in criminal cases." 8 '
The dissent's analysis of 38.07 as a law of witness competency is preferable to the majority's analysis of it as a sufficiency
of the evidence rule, because the dissent's view comports best
with the purposes of the Ex Post Facto Law Clause. 2 The ex
post facto ban assures citizens fair warning and reasonable reliance and prohibits the legislature from improperly interfering
Article 38.07, like an accomplice corin the judicial process.
roboration statute, is consistent with these goals and purposes.
276See
"'

ia.

SeeAdler, supra note 17.

See id-

218

See Carmell, 120 S. Ct. at 1645 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting) ("Texas's requirement of
corroboration or outcry, like similar provisions in otherjurisdictions, is premised on a
legislative judgment that accusations made by sexual assault victims above a certain
age are not independently trustworthy").
..Id. (Ginsburg,J., dissenting).
2" Id. at 1653 (GinsburgJ., dissenting).
28 See Adler, supra note 17, at 1219; see also supra Section IIA, discussion of the
three main purposes for the Ex Post Facto Clause.
21 See
id
284see id
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Although a citizen may not be aware of the evidentiary protections provided in Article 38.07, she has constructive notice that
sexual contact with a minor is a criminal offense.25 Likewise, a
citizen may not be aware of the laws requiring accomplice corroboration, but she has constructive notice about the criminal
nature of her actions. 28
Moreover, an accomplice corroboration requirement is not
a rule that is meant to induce reliance on the part of the general public, and neither is Article 38.07. Finally, Texas Article
38.07, like a rule of accomplice corroboration, is not a "capricious or vindictive legislative action that is repugnant to the ex
post facto prohibition."m Article 38.07 and laws of accomplice
corroboration do not "single out" any particular person or
group, and are not used as a means of political oppression or
retribution.2
B. THE MAJORITY'S ANALYSIS OF FENWICK'S CASE

Second, the majority's decision is incorrect because Justice
Stevens relied too heavily on Sir John Fenvick's case, cited in
Calder, in reaching the conclusion that Texas Article 38.07
qualified as an ex post facto law under the fourth Calder category.290 The majority explained that an analysis of Fenwick's
case would be helpful because it is cited in Calderas an example
of the fourth category of ex post facto laws.2" The majority devoted a substantial portion of the opinion to discussing the facts
of Fenwick's case and to analogizing those facts to Carmell's
Ultimately, the Court concluded that Texas Article
situation.

See id (noting that a defendant is "on constructive notice of the criminal nature
of her action and the degree to which society would seek to punish it").
287 See id
21See

id.

''Id-

Id see also supra Section VA (discussion of the egregious nature of laws that single out individuals).
2" See supra, Section IVA, at 38-39 (discussion of the majority's analysis of Fenwick's
case).
2" See Carme/ 120 S. Ct. at 1629 ("Justice Chase and Wooddeson both cited several
examples of ex post facto laws, and, in particular, cited the case of SirJohn Fenvick as
an example of the fourth category. To better understand the type of law that falls
within that category, then, we turn to Fenwick's case for preliminary guidance").
' See supra Section IVA (discussion of majority's analogy between Fenwuch and
Carmelt; see also supra Section lIB (discussion of the facts of Fenwick's case).
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38.07 fell under the fourth Calder category of ex post facto laws
because the facts in Carmell paralleled those in Fenwick's case.29
Although Justice Chase did cite to Fenwick's case as an example of the fourth category, Fenwick's case was never discussed
again by the Supreme Court, not even in those cases that involved a procedural rule that would come under the fourth
category of Calder.2 If Fenwick's case were considered an important guiding principle in a determination of ex post facto
laws under the fourth Calder category, the Court would have
used it as such in the precedent cases addressing procedural
statutes.295 Additionally, Fenwick's case is mentioned only briefly
in Calder?96 and is cited as an example of more than one category
of ex post facto laws.29 7 As the dissent noted, the four-category
formulation in Calderis itself only dictum.298 The majority made
no attempt to explain why Fenwick's case should be resurrected
as a '"uide" for determining if procedural laws were ex post
facto.
In short, the majority diverged from the reasoning of
well-establish precedent in using Fenwick's case, a case mentioned only briefly in Calder and never again, as a major determinant that Texas Article 38.07 violated the Ex Post Facto
Clause of the Constitution. s00
2' See Carmell, 120 S. Ct. at 1632; see also supra Section IVA. (discussion of majority's reliance on Fenwick).
" See Cummings, 71 U.S. 277; Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221 (1883); Hopt, 110
U.S. 574; Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380 (1898); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167
(1925); Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990).
" See Cummings, 71 U.S. 277; Kring, 107 U.S. 221; Hopt, 110 U.S. 574; Thompson,
171 U.S. 380; Beazel, 269 U.S. 167; Collins, 497 U.S. 37. None of these cases make any
reference to Fenwick's example.
29 See Calder, 3 U.S. at 389 (Fenwick's case is mentioned in a footnote. The entire
text of the footnote reads: "The case of SirJohn Fenwick, in 1696").
27 See id. (citingFenwick's case for two propositions, "declaring acts to be
treason,
which were not treason, when committed," and violating "the rules of evidence (to
supply a deficiency of legal proof) by admitting one witness, when the exiting law required two").
See Carmell, 120 S. Ct. at 1651 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that Justice
Chase's formulation was dictum, because Calderinvolved a civil statute).
See id. at 1629.
See id. at 1629-1632 (whereas Calder mentioned Fenwick's case in passing, the
majority in Carmell makes it a central focus of inquiry; the majority fully discusses the
facts of the case, analogizes them to Carmell's case, and determines that the two fact
patterns are so similar, that Texas Article 38.07 must fall under the fourth category of
Calder); IR at 1641 (in responding to the dissenting opinion, as well, the majority relies on Fenwick's case as "the guide").
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Furthermore, even if the majority were correct in relying on
Fenwick's case to invalidate Texas Article 38.07, Justice Stevens
overstated the analogy between the facts of Fenwick's case and
the facts of Carmell's. 30 ' Most importantly, Fenwick's case involved a Bill of Attainder; the Parliament passed a special piece
of legislation targeted at one individual and one individual
alone: Fenwick 30 No such situation existed in Carmell's case.
In Carmell, the legislature passed a general piece of legislation
3 The distargeting criminal procedure in all sex offense cases.03
tinction between these two types of legislative actions is paramount;3' 4 the Framers regarded Bills of Attainder as especially
egregious to a fundamental notion of justice, and as such, implicates all of the reasons the framers promulgated the Ex Post
Facto Clause 5 A Bill of Attainder, the Court argued in Cummings, usurps the judicial function and removes all of the protections of trial from the criminal defendant."'
In contrast, Texas Article 38.07 does not implicate the concerns of the Ex Post Facto Clause. 7 Texas Article 38.07 was not
.' See id. at 1631-32 (the majority noted that "Indeed, the circumstances of petitioner's case parallel those of Fenwick's case 300 years earlier").
' Id. at 1630; See Cummings, 71 U.S. at 323 (noting that bills of attainder "are generally directed against individuals by name," and that "[b] ills of this sort... have been
most usually passed in England in times of rebellion, or gross subservency to the
crown, or of violent political excitements; periods, in which all nations are most liable
(as well the free as the enslaved) to forget their duties, and to trample upon the rights
and liberties of others").
•3 SeeTax. CODE CRB1. P. ANN. art. 38.07 (West 2000); se also Crmel4 120 S. Ct. at
1624.
" See Calder, 3 U.S at 390. Ifiustice Chase cited Fenwick's case because of the particularly egregious act of Parliament in altering the rules of evidence to target one edzvidual, than the Carmell Court's analogy fails. Texas Article 38.07, unlike the law in
Fenwick's case, was not amended in order to target an individual.
?'-' See Cummings, 71 U.S. at 323 (explaining the special nature of Bills of Attainder:.
"In these cases the legislative body, in addition to its legitimate functions, exercises
the powers and office ofjudge; it assumes, in the language of the text-books, judicial
magistracy, it pronounces upon the guilt of the party, without any of the forms or
safeguards of trial; it determines the sufficiency of the proofs produced, whether conformable to the rules of evidence or otherwise; and it fixes the degree of punishment
in accordance with its own notions of the enormity of the offense"); see also Mark
Strasser, Ex PostFacto Laws, Bills of Attainder, and the Definition of Punishment: on Doma,
the HawaiiAmendment, and Federal ConstitutionalConstraints, 48 SRACUSE L RE%. 227,
238-39 (1998).
- See id.
"7 See Carme/! 120 S. Ct. at 1650-51 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that Texas
Article 38.07 does not implicate either of two important purposes for which the Fx
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passed with Scott Leslie Carmell in mind but as a general measure, affecting all citizens. As the dissent argued, "the amendment of Texas 38.07 simply brought the rules governing certain
victim testimony in sexual offense prosecutions into conformity8
with Texas law governing witness testimony generally." 8
Moreover, Texas Article 38.07 removed none of the protections
of a criminal trial; Carmell received a full trial, with benefit of
counsel, before a jury, and he was presumed innocent until the
prosecution could prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he
had committed the offenses for which he was charged. Because
Fenwick's case involved a Bill of Attainder, it is inherently different from Carmell's case; whereas Fenwick was the target of
"vindictive" legislation, aimed specifically at him, Carmell was
simply subjected to a general procedural rule applied to all
criminal defendants in sex offense cases.
C. THE MAJORITYS TREATMENT OF BEAZELL AND COLLINS

Third, the majority's decision was incorrect because even if
Justice Stevens was correct in his assertion that Article 38.07
meets the definition set forth in the fourth Calder category, the
majority ignored precedent that effectively nullified that category.30 The majority argued that Collins was at best "cryptic" on
the issue of whether the fourth Calder category was still good
law.31 Further, the majority argued that if Collins intended to
nullify the fourth category of Calder, "we think it strange that it
would have done so in a footnote." 31' These arguments avoid
the ultimate conclusion reached by Collins.32 First, Collins paid
deference to the four categories of Calder, but only as a general
principle, and the Court further explained that the Beazell definition was the one best suited to the original understanding of the
Post Facto clause was promulgated: "to assure that legislative Acts give fair warning of
their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly changed,"
and to "[restrict] governmental power by restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation").
Id. at 1651 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting).
See Collins, 497 U.S. at 37.
0 See Carmell, 120 S. Ct. at 1635 (noting that "it seems most accurate to say that
Collins is rather cryptic").
...
Id. at 1636.

1 It is interesting to note that Collins was authored by ChiefJustice Rehnquist, who
dissented in Carmell. Wouldn't ChiefJustice Rehnquist, the author of Collins, be in the
best position to determine if the Court meant to nullify the fourth principle of Calder?
Of course.
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framers.13 The majority is correct that the Collins Court mentioned Beazell's omission of the fourth Calder category in a footnote, but the fact that the Court did so does not necessarily
mean that it was any less serious about adopting the Beazell definition. It is important to note that directly after the Collins
Court explained the omission, it adopted the Beazell definition
as "faithful to our best knowledge of the original understanding
of the Ex Post Facto Clause."1 4
Most importantly, in analyzing the facts involved in Collins,
the Court did not apply the four categories of Calder;,the Court
ultimately applied the Beazell formulation in determining that
the Texas statute did not offend the Ex Post Facto Clause, even
though the statute was a rule of procedure.3 5 The majority in
Carmell ignored the fact that the Collins Court ultimately applied
the Beazell formulation, and ignored the fact that the Collins
Court did so with a rule of procedure, one which typically
should have been subjected to analysis under the fourth category of Calder. 1d The Collins Court's ultimate application of the

Beazell formulation as a pragmatic matter, along with its ringing
endorsement of the Beazell formulation in direct comparison
with the four Caldercategories (and the explicit recognition that
Beazell omitted the fourth category) lead to one inescapable
conclusion: the Collins court effectively nullified the fourth
category of Calder,and replaced the four-category Calder formuin Beazell.317
lation with the more general formulation provided
3 See Collins,497 U.S. at 42-43.
314I

See id. at 51. The Court applied the Beazell test in reaching itsholding: "The
Texas statute allowing reformation of improper verdicts does not punish as a crime
an act previously committed, which was innocent when done; nor make more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission; nor deprive one charged
with crime of any defense available according to law at the time when the act was
committed. Its application to respondent therefore is not prohibited by the Ex Post
Facto Clause."
316
See Carmell, 120 S. Ct. at 1635-36.
31'

317

See Neil Colman McCabe and Cynthia Ann Bell, Ex Post Facto Provsons of State

Constitutions,4 EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONST. L. 133, 134-35 (1991) (explaining that the
"four categories.., have not stood the test of time," and that Collins Court narrowed
the scope of the Ex Post Facto Clause, and curtailed the fourth category); Victoria L
Miller, V.

CriminalProcedure: Trial and Post-trialIssues, 29 RUTGERS LJ. 1257, 1288

(1998) (acknowledging that the Collins Court adopted the Beazell formulation for the
definition of ex post facto laws, and acknowledging that the Braze! formulation omitted the fourth category of Calder); Matteo, supra, note 25, at 595.
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Thus, Carmell majority's response that Collins is "cryptic" is unpersuasive.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's decision in Carmell was incorrect for
three reasons. First, the majority erroneously concluded that
Article 38.07 was a rule affecting the sufficiency of the evidence
needed to convict." 8 In reality, 38.07 does not affect the ultimate sufficiency of the evidence standard: the prosecution's
burden of proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt. l9 Additionally, 38.07 functions exactly like a rule of witness competency, the alterations of which were upheld in Hopt.-20 Second,

the majority in Carmell relied too heavily on a three-hundredyear-old case that was mentioned only briefly in Calder v. Bull,
and never again, even in cases that implicated Calder's fourth
principle.32 ' In addition, the majority's reliance on that case was
misplaced; the facts surrounding Fenwick's execution are inherently different from the facts in Carmell.322 Third, even if the
majority were correct in its assertion that 38.07 fell under the
fourth category of Calder, the majority ignored important
precedent that effectively nullified that category. 2 3 As a result,
the majority frustrated what the Collins Court sought to achieve:
eradication of the confusion surrounding whether procedural
rules violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. 2 4 Thanks to the Carmell
Court, the situation is now more confused than ever.
Danielle Kitson

sIB See supra notes 254-55; see also supraSection VB (discussion of Article 38.07 as a
law of witness competency).
319See id.
320See supra note 94.
' See supra Section VA (discussion of the majority's reliance on Fenwick's case).
32 See icL
" See supra note 310; see also supra Section VC (discussion of the abandonment of
Calder'sfourth category.
121 See supranote
260.

